Arnold Toynbee believes that a civilization may emerge through 1) the spontaneous mutation of a pre-civilizational society, 2) stimulation of a pre-civilizational society to develop into a civilization by the influence of an already existent civilization, or 3) disintegration of one or more civilizations of older generation and the transformation of some of their elements into a new configuration (Toynbee 1995: 85). Mohammad aimed at achieving a universal religion through a universal message. In Medina, Muhammad found a government with a leadership, an army, a taxation system and a new social order. The leadership was composed by a chief (Muhammad himself) surrounded by a Council of Ten (Ashara Mubashshara) representing the most powerful tribes and fractions. The crucial decisions concerning war and peace in particular were taken in consultation (mashvara) with members of the Council. The army was composed of all members of the community which at that time was quite limited. Muhammad, in the capacity of prophet and leader, was also the supreme commander of the army and participated himself in most of the battles (ghazavât). The new administration and army were mainly financed by two sources: taxation (zakât) and donation (sadaqât), and booty (qanima). The social order was based on equality (musavât) between members of the Umma/community. However, equality was rather a formal principle. A well-defined hierarchical system regulated the range and status 371 of each group: the early Believers (Sahâba), which had its own hierarchical order (the
political scientist , philosophers saluted the banner of religion in deference to political and social responsibility. The prevalent political philosophy, inspired by Al-Fârâbi held religious to be symbolic representations of the truth. The true and the good were determined autonomously, not on a religious background, and these criteria became the measure and standard for religion. Philosophy was viewed as independent of, not as ancillary to, faith and theology (Kraemer 1986: 15) .
It was also in the same period that Islamic civilization became cosmopolitan and tolerant, where Muslims were prepared to discuss religious issues with others on a fair basis without threat of retribution (Kraemer 1986: 29) . In fact, during this period, ‚most Arabic-writing faylasûfs/philosophers were either Christian, Jews, or Muslims; they all acknowledged the pagan Greek sages, especially Plato and Aristotle‛ (Hodgson 1974: 430‛I‛) . Kraemer attributes the open-minded character of Islamic civilization, during the Axial Age, to the emergence of an affluent and influential middle class, which, having the desire and means to acquire knowledge and social status, contributed to the cultivation and diffusion of ancient culture (Kraemer 1986: 4) .
The Islamic civilization reached its zenith under the caliphate of whose ‚intellectual curiosity was far-reaching, and his works are collections of rare and interesting knowledge concerning the human and natural world: countries, animals, the oddness of human beings‛ (Hourani 1991: 52) . Al-Ma'mûn was the first Islamic ruler who created an official forum for free debates for intellectuals and scientists. This forum was called the ‚House of Wisdom‛/bayt al-hikma.
Al-Ma'mûn opened his court to all kinds of intellectual tendencies, also to those philosophers and moralists whose ideas were banished by the orthodox Ulama. His personal preference was undoubtedly rationalism and especially the Mu'tazili movement which at that time was the dominant school of thought in both Basra and Baghdad. There is evidence that some prominent Mu'tazili figures such as Bishr Ibn alMu'tamir and Tumamam Ben Ashras had free access to the Caliph's court. Other
Mu'tazilis (e.g. Bishr al-Marisi) played the role of mentor for Al-Ma'mûn. Josef Van Ess, who has studied Mu'tazilism intensely, thinks that it is very plausible that AlMa'mûn's inclination for rationalism stems from the period of his residence in Khorasan, where Hellenism was dominant from the epoch of Alexander the Great. Furthermore, it is also possible that Al-Ma'mûn created the ‚House of Wisdom‛ under Hellenistic inspiration, the Academy (Van Ess 1984: 27) .
Hellenism survived a few centuries more in Islamic life, producing a group of philosophers, moralists and writers such as , , , who tried to reconcile Hellenism with Islam, Avicenna (980-1037) , and Averroës (1126-1198) who still shine in the memory of Muslims. They disappeared gradually and gave way to the dogmatics and theologians. Jurists such as Al-Ghazâli (1058 -1111 and Ibn Taymiyya (1263 Taymiyya ( -1328 belong to this group.
In short, this epoch was characterized by two trends. The Islamic Empire reached its peak of power, conquest, and prosperity. The Abbasid Empire represented at that time the most powerful state in the world. The second predominant trend was deep infiltration of Hellenistic ideas and cosmology which contributed to an opening of dialogue. After the end of this period, the Islamic intellectual vitality changed place, moving slowly from Baghdad, Basra, Damascus and Cairo to Southern Spain, and Andalusia, which represents the second Islamic intellectual, glorious epoch.
Andalusia evokes to Muslims a splendid epoch, intellectually and scientifically.
Politically, however, the Muslim situation at that particular time was almost chaotic and full of confusion.
In political terms, Andalusia was in clear opposition to Al-Ma'mûn's epoch. At this time, the central authority in Baghdad began to weaken and faced new and serious challenges. Consequently, some relatively small dynasties began to establish themselves as autonomous or independent in different parts of the immense Abbasid Empire. One of these Empires was founded in Southern Spain by Umayyad ‚princes‛ who had escaped from the Abbasids' yoke. The Andalusian adventure, in the most positive meaning of the word, began with the Cordou Caliphate (929-1031) and continued for three centuries. This Caliphate was a successor of an Emirate which was established by the emigrants who came to North Africa and then to Southern Spain because of the Abbasid repression. During these centuries, there was great political and religious tolerance in the area. This was a necessary condition for close collaboration between the scientists of different races, religion, and political convictions. Juan Vernet's (Vernet 1978 /1985 great book on La cultura hispanoàrabe en Oriente y Occidente and the two volumes edited by Salma Khadra Jayyusi (1994) entitled The Legacy of Muslim Spain perfectly describe the rise and fall of the Andulasian epoch. All disciplines of arts, music, botany, mathematics, medicine, astrology, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and many other branches were represented at that time in Andalusia. The extraordinary vitality of culture and science in this period was so great and of such variety that it is difficult to choose specific examples.
The Andalusian experience accomplished at least two main objectives: first, it created a cosmopolitan forum for different scholars of different disciplines. This extraordinary task could not have been accomplished without creating a hospitable environment. The result was overwhelming and greatly benefited Europe. As Margarita Lopes Gómez put it:
The flood of translations centered around the preferred fields of mathematics and science. It is to Islamic culture that we owe our knowledge of numbers, including the zero, of Indian origin but transmitted by a Muslim from Persia named AlKhwârizmî, and Muslims also developed geometry, demonstrated the position and movements of the planets and made many other scientific and medical discoveries, such as the discovery of the minor circulation of the blood, in the seventh-thirteenth century, by the Arab doctor Ibn-al-Nafîs (in Jayyusi 1994 : 1060 .
Second, and actually the result of the first, is the transfer of Hellenistic knowledge to medieval Europe. This transfer was undoubtedly crucial to the beginning of the Renaissance in Europe. Montesquieu affirms that ‚there were the Mahometans (Moors of Spain) who transmitted sciences to Occident; since then, they have never wished to take benefit of what they had given us‛ (Montesquieu *1949+: 1569 .
The glorious epoch of rationalism and Hellenism reached its end when dogmatism and jurisprudence became dominant again in Islam. Montesquieu believes that the destruction of the Caliphate led to the destruction of sciences for Mahometans (ibid). In fact, Al-Ghazâli (1058-1111) was perhaps the first, or at least the most reputed, theologian who introduced Islam to dogmatism. Later, in the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldun (1332 Khaldun ( -1406 tried to reintroduce rationalism in Islamic culture by founding the sociological school and his famous Prologomena (Al-Muqaddimah). Unfortunately, he was too late because the people of Islam were already in a deep crisis which finally led them to several centuries of decadence.
The Ma'mûnian and the Andalusian examples showed that the free dialogue and exchange of views and experiences were possible in two different contexts. When the central authority of the Islamic Empire was strong enough and confident -e.g. the Abbasids under Al-Ma'mûn -it could afford and neutralize any attempt at subversion.
But when the central authority was disintegrated into a variety of small emirates, sultanates and caliphates in Andalusia and North Africa, the opposite was the case.
The fall of Baghdad in 1258 and the end of the Abbasid Empire by Hulâku, the grandson of Genghis Khan, also marked the beginning of further political division of the Islamic Empire. The Empire was divided among a variety of large and small emirates, sultanates, khanates, etc.
The question now is how and under what circumstances this brilliant, cosmopolitan, tolerant, integrative and dynamic civilization declined? And when did the decline of the Islamic civilization begin? All authors agreed that Islam had created a civilization.
They also agreed that the Islamic civilization reached its peak between the nineth and the second half of the tenth century (A.D.) continuing circa three centuries ahead.
Fernand Braudel even specifies two dates: one for the beginning and the other for the end of the Islamic civilization. According to him, the golden age lasted from 813, the year of Al-Ma'mûn's caliphate and ended with the death of Averroës -the Cordoba physician and commentator on the works of Aristotle -in Marrakesh in 1198 (Braudel 1995: 73 (Kraemer 1986: 6) . Moreover, their approach to philosophy was more literal and textual than critical.
The knowledge was used rather for the purpose of refinement and urbanity (adab/âdâb) than as a commitment to a specific philosophical system. Braudel attributes this fact to the force exercised by religion on philosophers. He says ‚as admirers of Aristotle, the Arab philosophers were forced into an interminable debate between prophetic revelation, that of the Koran, and a human philosophical explanation‛ (Braudel 1995: 83) . Second, general stagnation of Islamic civilization was due to the spring of a powerful Islamic dogmatism in the twelfth century which aimed at eradicating philosophy as a compatible discipline with Islam as religion. This movement was led by theologians such as Al-Ghazâli 1 and Ibn Taymiyya. The rise of dogmatism put an end to the tolerant, integrative, cosmopolitan and dynamic character which were the dominant trends of the golden age.
Geo-strategic explanation. Following this explanation, the decline began when power was taken over by barbarian soldier slaves (Seljuqs/Saljuks) in almost all of the Muslim territories. Parallel to this, a dramatic circumstance with long and substantial consequences ensued: after the twelfth century, Islam ‚lost the control of the sea‛ (Braudel 1995: 87 (Toynbee 1948: 62) . From this moment, Islam became an exclusively territorial power deprived of the modern means of communication, which held the necessary and efficient instruments for political, economic, and cultural power.
Technological-scientific explanation. The Galileo and the Copernican revolutions fundamentally changed the human view on the world and on itself. These revolutions transformed the mentality of the population which resulted in the Renaissance and the birth of European civilization. The point is that the Islamic civilization remained untouched and uninformed. It continued its traditional way which at the time was equivalent to stagnation and further disintegration. The emerged technological rationality was characterized by three elements: 1) the progressive conquest of all areas of knowledge by mathematics; 2) the application of scientific knowledge through associated technology; and 3) the appearance of an impersonal bureaucracy (Shayegan 1997: 85) . None of these elements were present in the Islamic world. Furthermore, the technological revolution demanded a secular scientific rationalism. Islam, after having experienced a dose of rationality, secularity and cosmopolitan culture during three or four centuries (ninth-thirteenth), did actually return to dogmatism and the revivification of theological sciences (fiqh and kalâm). 3 In short, the technological backwardness of Islamic civilization at that time was enhanced by a gradual intellectual and mental backwardness. And this was the cause of its decline.
Unification of the World. This explanation is a sort of combination of various elements
causing the decline of Islamic civilization. It is to say that the loss of the sea, the return to dogmatism, and technological backwardness made the Islamic civilization incapable of being dynamic and integrative. Essentially, the reason was that the sense and orientation of encounters were changed. The revolutionary Western invention was the substitution of the ocean for the steppe as the principal medium of worldcommunication (Toynbee 1948: 70 The decline of these Asian civilizations brought their mutual cross-fertilizations to an end. The era of the great translations leading to fruitful encounters between India and China, Iran and India, China and Japan, came to an end. These great civilizations turned away from each other and towards the West. They withdraw from history, entered a phase of passivity, stopped renewing themselves and lived increasingly on their accumulated fat. They were like rich aristocratic families overtaken by events, ruined by a shift in economic reality, who keep up appearances for a time by selling off their inheritance bit by bit: jewelry, paintings, carpets, silver, everything, until the bitter day comes when there is nothing left (Shayegan 1997: 44) .
The ‚unification of the world‛ did not come about through the introduction of modern communications and transportation facilities only. The most substantial change occurred in the field of economy. ‚For the first time in human history, an instance of a world-economy survived its ‚fragility‛ and consolidates itself as a capitalist system‛ (Wallerstein 1992: 223) . Without going into further discussion about the rise of capitalism, it should be noted that this was a qualitative change in world history which had (and still has) a huge impact on all civilizations, including the Islamic.
Continuing its fall, the Islamic civilization completely lost the characteristic drive and will of the golden age. The decline was so striking that some authors asked whether a Muslim civilization still existed (Braudel 1995: 111) . As we will see later on, the doubt about the existence of a Muslim civilization was not only Western. Muslims themselves (even the fundamentalists) asked the same question. What about the Ottoman Empire which was Islamic and survived for several centuries and was dissolved only in 1923?
It is true that the Ottoman Empire was Islamic, but this was rather by name than by essence. In reality, the Ottoman Empire was almost a culturally inert construction contributing little to the development of Islamic civilization. (Khatami 1997:183) .
In short, all Muslims acknowledged the decline of the Islamic civilization. They have interiorized this fact at the same time as they are avoiding to draw the necessary conclusion in accordance with the already observed and accepted fact.
While Muslims agree on the decline of Islamic civilization, they are significantly divided on the ways of reconstructing it. Is reconstruction possible? Is there any empirical evidence? Reconstruction differs from reproduction in the sense that the former does not aim at reproducing something identical to something else. On the contrary, reproduction is, in a way, aiming for reincarnation. One thing is a photography, another is a painting. Reproduction is mechanic and reconstruction intellectual. The process of reconstruction takes place at two stages: first ‚civilization‛ which is subjected to revision and renewal must be deconstructed. Without deconstruction, the concept of ‚civilization‛ will remain vague and a-historic. The proposed deconstruction model is based on a specification of the elements of a civilization, which, in a condensed form, is composed by two elements: a world vision and a historical formation. Subsequent to this acknowledgement, follows the second phase: the reconstruction stage. As we know, civilizations are generally long-lived extending over many centuries. When talking about the reconstruction of a specific civilization, we do not mean that the target civilization must be reconstructed in its entire life. We have a selected momentum, as well as certain values, ideas, concepts, organizing principles etc.; all of which relate to this specific civilization. By reconstruction, I mean that a civilization is a great civilization only when the world vision and the historical formation meet in a coherent and fertile manner. Thus, the Islamic civilization, which is our case of study, does not necessarily exist for fourteen centuries; probably just for three or four centuries where the above mentioned elements constitute one integrated system. The advantage of such a method stems from its empirical verifiability since we know when and in which specific periods the junction occurred. In this connection, the best and perhaps most unique example for a successful reconstruction of a declined civilization is the Renaissance. The Renaissance was a reconstruction of the Greek and Roman heritage all together. Athens represented the main source of inspiration, the ‚idea‛ and the ‚spirit‛ while Rome stood for the ‚body,‛ a form of organizing power based on law and prosperity. Apart from these two basic elements from which sprang the European civilization, Christianity added itself to it as an ad hoc element; subsequently the rising capitalism completed the construction. The Renaissance model exemplifies the course and the mechanism to apply for a successful reconstruction.
Following the above discussion, we have to investigate the possibilities, opportunities, and the Muslim view on the subject. What is important to know is that the Medina model is not considered the point of departure or a source of aspiration in itself. It is, indeed, the arrival and the final point; the harbor, not the voyage. Consequently, the task of Muslims, today as at any time in -but rather to discover the essence of Muslim identity and its refinement in the mentalities and habits as well as to achieve a rational criticism of the past in order to find the proper support for today<to reach a future more grand than the past.
Three Main Currents
They distinguish between religion and ideology, arguing also for a further distinction between society and Islam which is eternal and unchanging on the one side and, the ‚human understanding of Islam‛ which is changing on the other (Shariati and ‚universal references‛ has never been so strong as in our time‛ (Bourricauld 1987: 21) we have no other alternative than to admit the existence of such ‚references.‛ Where should we search for ‚universal references‛ today? Some may suggest the internet.
Actually, this is not a bad guess. But, more seriously, it seems obvious that the majority of these references are to be found in the Western civilization. Here, we have to distinguish Western civilization from Westernization. These two concepts have often been confused, hence creating further confusion, misunderstanding, and an opportunity to exercise manipulation of the people and to justify the authoritarian political regimes in Muslim countries. The distinction consists in the former concept referring to a set of values and concepts embodied in a world vision which is materialized in a specific historical formation generally referred to as Western civilization. Ideas such as belief in progress, freedom of speech and mind, equality, justice, democracy, and secularity are representative basic concepts of this civilization. Having said this, the objectionable side of the West expressed by colonialism, domination, exploitation, and war should not be ignored. The point is that the objectionable side is not the whole story of the West, and to reduce the West only to its non-civilized side would be incorrect.
Furthermore, these elements are far from being specifically Western; all other empires and civilizations have been expansionist, conducting war and committing crimes against humanity, including a succession of Islamic empires (e.g. the Umayyad, the Abbasid, and the Ottoman Empires). However, none of those were based on the trilogy liberté, égalité, fraternité or on other related ideas. In addition, none of those created an economic system (capitalism) which is applicable world wide for good and for bad.
The ‚Westernization‛ is a mimetic and mechanical adoption of some superficial and trivial aspects of the way of life in Western societies. Doing the things in a way that has no relation with the quality or state of being real. To allow import of goods with the sole purpose of emphasizing the consumer's distance from their indigenous environment. This is a kind of alienation, a ‚plague.‛ 13 This is one of the main reasons why, in Muslim societies, the West is often perceived as trivial, morally decadent, luxurious, dominant, arrogant all together, at the same time. In this imaginary world,
Westerners are caricatured as a bunch of immoral exploiters who, by stealing Muslim natural resources, do not have to work and may spend their time drinking alcohol and practicing free and bizarre sex.
Faced to the ‚Westernization,‛ the Muslim universalists deny this reductionist and superficial picture of Western civilization. They do not consider Western civilization as a civilization belonging only to the West. As Toynbee puts it: ‚The West is not just the West's own parochial concern but is their past history too‛ (Toynbee 1948: 83) . (Hodgson 1974: 436 ‚III‛) .
What is also necessary is a ‚heroic act, maybe; Promethean audacity, perhaps; rebellion against established truths, undoubtedly‛ (Shayegan 1997: 34) . The problem is that In the matter of History and Civilization, we [Muslims, Iranians?] This would pave the way to modernity, democracy and intellectual liberalism. For others, the Medina remains -forever -the true and valid model. Along these lines, ‚salvation‛ will be realized only by a return to the Medina model. The outcome of the inter-Muslim struggle will ultimately determine the Muslim response to globalization.
Notes
3 It is astonishing that Al-Ghazâli, the most prominent figure of dogmatism, named his monumental work ‚Revivification/Ihyâ‛ which is a clear indication of the dominant trend of his time. In fact, the revivification was a dogmatic renaissance; a rupture with philosophy and Hellenism and a return to theology. 4 ‚The 'Zealot' is a man who takes refuge from the unknown in the familiar, and when he joins battle with a stranger who practises superior tactics and employs formidable newfangled weapons, and finds himself getting the worst of the encounter, he responds by practising his own traditional art of war with abnormally scrupulous exactitude‛ (Toynbee 1948: 188) . The North African Sanusis and the Central Arabian Wahhabis (Saudi Arabia) are used as examples. 5 ‚The 'Herodian' is a man who acts on the principle that the most effective way to guard against the danger of the unknown is to master its secret; and, when he finds himself in the predicament of being confronted by a more highly skilled and better armed opponent, he responds by discarding his traditional art of war and learning to fight his enemy with the enemy's own tactics and own weapons‛ (Toynbee, 1948: 193-94 Vakili (1996) . 7 ‚Muslims‛ here are both the Muslim believers and those who were merely cultural or secular Muslims. 8 On this point, Mawdudi declares that ‚We aspire for an Islamic renaissance on the basis of the Qur'an. To use the Qur'anic spirit and Islamic tenets are immutable, but the application of this spirit in the realm of practical life must always vary with the change of conditions and increase of knowledge‛ (quoted in Nasr, 1996: 51) . 9 Khatami's statement on Medina is insightful. He says that ‚The civil society we have in mind has its origin from a historical and theoretical point of view, in Madinat ul-Nabî‛ which ‚remains our eternal moral abode‛ (Khatami 1997b Orientalism. See also his article on ‚An Islamic Approach to Multilateralism,‛1997. 13 Jalla Al-e Ahmad, an Iranian author whose writings have had a decisive influence on the decline of the Shah's regime described -not without exaggeration -the impact of
